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THE LAW OF REACTOR SAFETY
HAROLD P. GREEN*

Nuclear reactors are devices for creating and controlling nuclear
chain reactions. Reactors come in many sizes and shapes and have
various uses. The most dramatic and probably the most important use
of reactors from the economic standpoint is to provide power in the
form of electricity or heat. Some such power reactors may be stationary; others may be mobile, e.g., those which exist to provide propulsive force and hence move from place to place with their vehicle.1
Other reactors may be used for various industrial purposes such as
for the testing of materials. Still other reactors are used primarily
for educational and research purposes.
All reactors have safety implications in the sense that radiation is
incident to their operation. This means that considerable care must
be taken in operation of the reactor to assure that personnel working
on or with the reactor are not exposed to dangerous radiation. Such
precautions are essentially a matter of sound operating and administrative procedures. Although this phase of reactor safety is extremely important from the standpoint of legal considerations and
the public welfare, it is of secondary importance. Of primary concern
are the safety implications of reactor operations to the external
environment and particularly to those members of society who have
not voluntarily assumed the risk of working in proximity to the
reactor.
This latter problem relates essentially to the possibility that operation of a reactor may give rise to consequences adversely affecting
the health and safety of the general public. Such consequences might
arise in the case of normal operation of a reactor if proper safeguards
are not taken. For example, radioactive effluents or wastes may be
discharged into the atmosphere or into water supplies, and if proper
precautions are not taken, this could endanger the health and safety
of the public. But the principal hazards associated with operation of
a nuclear reactor are to be found in the possibility that the reactor
may develop some abnormality in its functioning which may result
in the accidental release into the environment of quantities of highly
radioactive material. One of the characteristics of nuclear reactors
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; Consulting Editor, CCH Atomic Energy
Law Reporter; formerly with Office of the General Counsel, United States
Atomic Energy Commission.
1. This article does not deal with problems of reactor safety in such mobile
reactors, since their use on a licensed basis is still at least several years off.
The legal considerations are, however, similar to those discussed herein for
stationary reactors, except, of course, for the complicating factor of mobility.
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is that they contain large amounts of radioactivity in the form of
fission products, i.e., waste resulting from the fission process, and it
is the possibility that these fission products may be released which is
the principal reason why reactors are regarded as inherently capable
of producing catastrophe. Another inherently complicating factor is
that it is difficult to turn a reactor off in the event of malfunction since
the fission products continue to generate heat for quite a while after
the reactor is shut down.
The design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors involve
extremely complex scientific, engineering, and technical considerations
which are far beyond the professional ken of the attorney. It would
be useful, however, to describe in brief and highly simplified form
2
some of the technical considerations pertinent to nuclear accidents.
Accidents which can produce escape of fission products from a nuclear
reactor fall into several distinct categories: 3
A nuclear runaway: Reactors are capable of attaining extremely
high power levels in extremely short periods of time in the event
control devices do not function properly. Where a power surge is not
adequately controlled and limited, the reactor becomes a runaway
reactor. As one eminent authority put it: "[T]he generation of heat
can outstrip any conceivable cooling means. ' 4 Such generation of
heat may cause melting, vaporization, or other disruption of the
reactor structure. The energy generated would not necessarily produce anything like a bomb explosion, 5 although in some reactors
something in the nature of a small "explosion" could result.6 Danger
to the environment results not primarily from the possibility of a
violent blast, but rather from the possibility that the runaway may
cause sufficient disruption of the system to cause the release of radioactivity into the environment. One of the principal concerns is that
fuel elements may melt down with the fissionable material's coming
together in such quantity and in such configurations as to cause accidental criticality, i.e., an accidental chain reaction.
Reactor designers guard against runaway reactors in several ways.
Adequate controls and instrumentation are, of course, quite necessary.
2. For more complete information on these technical considerations, see

McCULLOUGH, SAFETY ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS (1957). A more elementary
discussion may be found in SCHWENK & SHANNON, NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING

180-189 (1957).
3. This categorization is based upon McCuLLOUGH, Op. cit. supra note 2, at
139.
4. McCullough, Reactor Safety, NUCLEoNics 134, 136 (Sept. 1957).
5. An explosion of considerable violence can, however, result if these events
result in exothermic chemical reactions of the kind described infra. MCCULLOUGH, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 140.
6. This would be more analogous to an automobile accident than to a chemical explosion, i.e., portions of the reactor may be propelled "with velocities
of a few meters per second." Ibid.
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In addition it is desirable to have a "negative coefficient of reactivity."
When a negative coefficient of reactivity exists, the "insertion" of.
additional reactivity increases the power and heat generated, which in
turn causes certain changes such as expansion of fuel elements which
lead automatically to a corresponding decrease in reactivity. Thus,
the reactor is self-regulating. A third line of defense against runaway
is to assure that the amount of excess reactivity inserted into the
reactor is limited and that the rate of insertion is controlled. This can
be done by rigid regulation of the rate at which the control rods may
be moved and by appropriate precautions in fuel reloading operations.
Finally, it is desirable that the reactor be designed in such a manner
that disruption of the reactor system in the course of a runaway will
shut the reactor down, and that other steps be taken to assure against
accidental criticality or other factors which may cause the release
of radioactivity outside the reactor.
Failureof the coolant system: All reactors require a coolant system
to remove heat from the reactor. If the coolant system fails for any
reason, it is not adequate merely to shut the reactor down, since, as
has been pointed out, the fission products continue to generate substantial heat. Unless this situation can be prevented or brought under
control, the intense heat may cause disruption of the reactor system,
melt-down of the reactor, accidental criticality, or other circumstances
which may result in the release of fission products. As in the case of
the nuclear runaway, an accident of this kind would probably not be
a particularly violent event, but it may nevertheless result in substantial hazard through release of fission products. To guard against
accidents of this kind two general types of precautions are taken.
First of all, the coolant system is made as reliable as possible, and
some kind of separate and independent coolant system is provided for
standby emergency purposes. Secondly, standby emergency arrangements analogous to fire-fighting equipment may be provided.
Chemical Reactions: Either a nuclear runaway or a coolant failure,
or other possible occurrences, may produce a mixing of chemicals in
the reactor which could result in a violent chemical reaction of an
explosive nature. Thus, the mixing of molten uranium, oxygen, and
graphite, of molten uranium and water, or of sodium and air or water
can produce a substantial reaction. Designers of reactors must exert
great pains to minimize the possibility of such mixings.
Despite all reasonable and prudent precautions to assure that a
reactor will "fail safe," and despite the most painstaking administrative control, an accident such as is described above may occur causing
disruption of the reactor vessel and dispersion of fission products out-
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side the reactor. It is important, therefore, to shield the environment
from radiation hazard by enclosing the reactor itself within a vapor
shell, i.e., a building which will withstand whatever violent event may
occur within the reactor and which will contain whatever radiation
may escape from the reactor itself. Even if the force of the accident
is contained within the reactor enclosure, however, there is some
radiation "shine" or leakage which can have deleterious effects on life
outside of the structure. This suggests, finally, that some discretion
must be exercised in locating the reactor so that even if there is an
accident, the reactor and its containment structure are separated from
7
neighboring populations by an exclusion area belt.
It is generally believed by reactor experts that chances of a major
reactor accident "are exceedingly small" and "remote." 8 The possibility was, however, regarded as of sufficiently finite significance to deter
private investment in large nuclear reactors until federal legislation
was enacted to provide a $500,000,000 program for indemnification of
reactor operators against public liability claims arising out of reactor
accidents.9 In 1957, in connection with congressional consideration of
this indemnity legislation, the AEC undertook a study of the maximum
damage which could be caused by an accident in a typical power
reactor. 0 It was concluded, under quite pessimistic assumptions, that
in such a single accident: (1) as many as 3,400 persons might be killed
and 43,000 injured, (2) property damage might range from $500,000 to
$7,000,000,000, (3) people might be killed at distances up to 15 miles,
and injured at distances up to 45 miles, and (4) land contamination
might extend for even greater distances. At the same time, it was
more optimistically stated that in most of the theoretical reactor
7. Former AEC Chairman Strauss has stated that AEC's policy is to require
"multiple lines of defenses against accidents" so that "only by means of
highly unlikely combinations of mechanical and human failures" could releases of fission products occur. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1957).
8. See AEC, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, CCH ATomc ENERaGY L. REP. 1 4036
(1957).
9. The Atomic Industrial Forum, the principal spokesman for the nuclear
industry, stated in 1957 that the "financial protection problem" was the "major
roadblock .. .to broad, effective participation by private industry in the
rapid development of atomic power." Hearings, supra note 7, at 169. The
General Electric Company told the Joint Committee in 1957 that it would
halt some of its major nuclear power programs unless indemnity legislation
were promptly enacted. Id., at 148. The case was more euphemistically put
by Walker Cisler, President of Power Reactor Development Company: "[W]e
believe that no one should construct and operate a facility of the kind in
question without assurance that the public would be fully protected against
all possible incidents." See text at note 62 infra. Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 126 (1956). This legislation was finally enacted as 71 Stat. 576 (1957),
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. V, 1958).
10. AEC, op. cit. supra note 8.
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accidents which were considered in the study, "the total assumed
losses would not exceed a few hundred million dollars." In addition,
it was estimated that the probability of a major reactor accident significantly affecting the public ranged from one in 100,000 to one in
1,000,000,000 per year for each large reactor. Taking the most pessimistic assumptions, it was estimated that if 100 power reactors were
operating in the United States there would be less than one chance
in 50,000,000 of a given person's being killed in any year by a reactor
accident.
It is apparent from the above that, although the likelihood of a
major reactor accident is not great, the potential catastrophic impact
of any such accident is sufficiently great that consideration of reactor
safety must bulk large in the nation's legal framework for controlling
atomic energy.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON REACTOR SAFETY

The original Atomic Energy Act of 194611 was singularly silent on
questions of reactor safety. This is not too surprising in view of the
fact that this statute provided for a government monopoly, and precluded all private ownership of reactors. Thus, all reactors which
were built under the 1946 act or earlier were owned and operated by
the AEC and were located at isolated AEC installations such as Hanford and Oak Ridge, which were at a considerable distance from population centers. The AEC, moreover, not being concerned with problems of economic competition, was able to build into these reactors a
wide margin of safety since there was no particularly strong incentive
to cut costs, especially where cost-cutting would be at the expense of
safety.
The Atomic Energy Act of 195412 authorized private ownership, construction, and operation of reactors for the first time. Questions of
the hazards resulting from operation of reactors were very much in
the legislative mind when this legislation was under consideration by
Congress. Even a cursory reading of the 1954 act indicates that this
congressional concern with safety is reflected in the statutory provisions.
Chapter 10 of the 1954 act prohibits the manufacture, production,
transfer, acquisition, use or possession of a reactor without an AEC
license, 13 contains the basic provisions governing the licensing of
privately owned nuclear reactors, 14 and distinguishes among several
types of reactors and licenses. 15
11. 60 Stat.
12. 68 Stat.
13. 68 Stat.
14. 68 Stat.
15. Ibid.

755
919
936
936

(1946).
(1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (Supp. V, 1958).
(1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. V, 1958).

(1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133-34 (Supp. V, 1958).
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(1) Reactors determined by AEC as being "sufficiently developed to
be of practicalvalue for industrial or commercial purposes," require
"commercial licenses."'16 The concept of "practical value" has been
interpreted by the AEC to mean economic feasibility, 7 and at the
present time it seems unlikely that the "practical value" finding will
be made at any time within the next several years with respect to
any reactor. Commercial licenses are, therefore, something for the
future, and all reactors will be licensed for the next several years
under sections 104(a), (b), or (c) which are discussed below. It
might be pointed out, nevertheless, that insofar as safety is concerned,
the criteria for issuance of a commercial license restrict the issuance
to persons "who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe
such safety standards ... as the Commission may by rule establish,"
and who agree to make available to the AEC such data as it determines
to be necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. 18 The
AEC is, moreover, expressly barred from issuing a commercial license
to any person if in its opinion the issuance "would be inimical ...
to the health and safety of the public."'19
(2) Reactors for use in medical therapy are licensed under section
104 (a).20 This provision includes no affirmative language as to safety,
and refers explicitly to safety only in that the AEC is directed to
"impose the minimum amount of regulation consistent with its obligations ... to promote the common defense and security and to protect
the health and safety of the public."
(3) Reactors used in research and development leading to demonstration of practicalvalue are licensed under section 104 (b).21 As in
the case of medical reactors, there is no reference to safety except
that the AEC is directed to impose the "minimum amount of such
regulations and terms of license as will permit the Commission to
fulfill its obligations.., to promote the common defense and security
and to protect the health and safety of the public. '22 As an added
wrinkle, however, it is provided that the AEC's regulations for section
104 (b) facilities must be "compatible with the regulations and terms
16. 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (Supp. V, 1958).
17. Testimony of AEC General Manager Fields, Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth and State of the
Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 394 (1956).
18. 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
19. 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (Supp. V, 1958).
20. 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
21. 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134(b) (Supp. V, 1958). All large scale
nuclear power reactors now being constructed are to be licensed under §
104(b).
22. Despite this invitation, AEC's regulations do not provide for different
degrees of regulation for various types of reactors.
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of license" which would apply if a commercial license under section
103 were later to be issued for that type of facility.
(4) Research reactors are licensed under section 104 (c),23 and the
AEC is directed to impose "only such minimum amount of regulation
of the licensee" as it finds necessary to enable it to fulfill its statutory
obligations to promote the common defense and security and to protect
the health and safety of the public.
It will be noted that, despite the fact that the bulk of AEC administrative law regarding nuclear reactors is concerned with reactor
safety, sections 103 and 104 are virtually devoid of standards for
reactor safety. The legislative history of these provisions is equally barren. Some further light is, however, cast by those provisions, which
deal with judicial review and administrative procedure. Section
182 (a) 24 of the act describes the requirements for license applications.
In addition to giving the AEC broad authority to determine what
information must be included in the application to enable the Commission to determine inter alia the "technical qualifications ...or other
qualifications of the applicant," section 182 (a) explicitly requires
that the applicant state "such technical specifications ... including the
place of the use, the specific characteristics of the facility, and such
other information as the Commission may . .. deem necessary" in
order to enable it to find that the reactor processes "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the statute does not provide
any clear and explicit standard of safety for application in determining
whether a reactor license should be issued.
There is a related provision of the act which is not at all helpful
in finding standards for reactor safety, but which is the most important provision of the act from the safety standpoint. This is section
185 which provides:
All applicants for licenses to construct or modify production or utilization facilities shall, if the application is otherwise acceptable to the Commission, be initially granted a construction permit. The construction
permit shall state the earliest and latest dates for the completion of the
construction or modification. Unless the construction or modification of
the facility is completed by the completion date, the construction permit
shall expire, and all rights thereunder be forfeited, unless upon good
cause shown, the Commission extends the completion date. Upon the
completion of the construction or modification of the facility, upon the
filing of any additional information needed to bring the original application up to date, and upon finding that the facility authorized has been
constructed and will operate in conformity with the application as
amended and in conformity with the provisions of this Act and of the
23. 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
24. 68 Stat. 953 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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rules and regulations of the Commission, and in the absence of any good
cause being shown to the Commission why the granting of a license would
not be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the Commission
shall thereupon issue a license to the applicant. For all other purposes of
this Act, a construction permit is deemed to be a "license."25
This provision contemplates that construction of a reactor will be
undertaken pursuant to the provisions of a construction permit, which
is essentially a form of license and is treated in all procedural respects
as a license. Although the issuance of the construction permit is the
principal event in the life of a reactor project since it leads to the
investment of very substantial sums for construction of the reactor
at a definite location in the expectation that it will be operated after
completion of construction, there are no standards for issuance of the
construction permit other than that the application is "otherwise
acceptable to the Commission."
The construction permit provision of the Atomic Energy Act quite
clearly was borrowed from the Federal Communications Act of
1934,26 which also envisages issuance of construction permits which
are to be converted into operating licenses upon completion of construction of radio stations. The legislative history of the Federal
Communications Act Indicates that the construction permit provisions
of that act are intended to prohibit construction of radio stations
until a determination is made that an operating license probably would
issue in order "to free the licensing authority from the pressure for
a license which might be exerted if a large expenditure had been
made in the thoughtless anticipation of the granting of the license."27
This consideration was apparently also in the congressional mind when
section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was considered since one
or two senators pointed out that a license applicant's expenditure of
substantial funds on construction of a reactor pursuant to a construction permit would make it rather difficult for the AEC subsequently to
refuse issuance of an operating license. 28 Similarly, industry spokesmen pointed out the necessity for the AEC's making a determination
upon issuance of a construction permit that the permit would be more
or less automatically converted into a license upon completion of
construction, since an applicant could not be expected to invest
substantial sums in construction without some assurance that it would
25. 68 Stat. 955 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (Supp. V, 1958).

26. 48 Stat. 1089 (1934), as amended, 66 Stat. 718 (1952), 68 Stat. 35 (1954),
47 U.S.C. § 319 (Supp. V, 1958).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 4 (1923). Decisions of the FCC
have been to the same effect. See In re WSAU, Inc. and WJIU-TV, 10 R.R.
402 (1955).
28. 100 CONG. REC. 11196, 12014 (1954) (remarks of Senator Humphrey);
100 CONG. REc. 11560 (1954) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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be permitted to operate the reactor.29 To allay industry's concern on
this point, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated in its report
on the legislation that section 185 "requires the issuance of a license
if the construction is carried out in accordance with the terms of the
30
construction permit."
Although the legislative history of the 1954 act contains a few rather
weak references to the construction permit concept as a device for
controlling reactor safety, 31 one could certainly not get the impression
that this was uppermost in the congressional view in enacting section
185. Nevertheless, it became quite clear, immediately upon enactment
of the 1954 act, that the AEC regarded considerations of reactor safety
as the paramount aspect of its licensing procedures. It was publicly
stated by AEC spokesmen that hazards evaluation would be the major
part of the AEC's consideration of license applications, and that the
principal test for issuance of a construction permit would be whether
the AEC believes the proposed reactor can be safely operated at the
proposed site after construction.3
ON REACTOR SAFETY
As has been pointed out, the safety standards for issuance of reactor
licenses are rather vague, and the standard for issuance of a construction permit (i.e., "otherwise acceptable to the Commission") is about
as vague as is possible. Presumably the AEC was expected to establish more definite criteria and standards by promulgating rules and
regulations. Thus, section 161 (b) 3 of the act authorizes the AEC to
promulgate safety standards and instructions governing the possession and use of radioactive material, and section 161 (i) authorizes
the AEC to promulgate such regulations and orders as it may deem
necessary
REGULATIONS

29. Testimony of Oscar Ruebhausen, Hearings Before the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862 to Amend the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1954); Testimony of E. H. Dixon, Id. at 227.
30. H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1954). (Emphasis added.)

It is clear, despite this language, that conversion of the construction permit
to an operating license is far from automatic, and that substantial discretion
rests with AEC as to whether or not the conversion will be effected. Thus, in
1957, § 189 (a) of the 1954 act was amended to require notice of and a hearing on
every application for a license for a major reactor. 68 Stat. 955 (1954), as
amended, 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (Supp. V, 1958). The Report

of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on this amendment made it clear

that such a hearing was to be held on both construction permits and operating
licenses. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1957).
31. The strongest authoritative statement was by Rep. Hinshaw, a member
of the Joint Committee. Hearings,supra note 29, at 118.
32. Testimony of Harold L. Price, Director of the AEC's Division of Li-

censing and Regulation, Hearings Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Appropriations on Second Supplemental AppropriationBill for 1957,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1956).
33. 68 Stat. 948 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
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to govern any activity authorized pursuant to this chapter, including
standards and restrictions governing the design, location, and operation of
facilities ... in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or
property. 34
Unfortunately, however, the regulations are almost as vague as the
statute.
The regulations promulgated by the AEC on reactor licensing 35
include detailed requirements as to the material which must be submitted as part of license applications. 36 Most of the information
required of the applicant pertains directly to safety considerations. In
addition to data as to the applicant's technical and financial qualifications37 and a statement as to the earliest and latest dates proposed for
completion of the facility, the applicant is required to submit certain
technical information in the form of a "hazards summary report." The
hazards summary report must include:
(1) A description of the processes to be performed in the reactor
(including quantitative data as to radioactive material to be handled
and power to be generated) and the nature and quantity of radioactive effluent expected to result.
(2) A description of the facility based on design criteria in sufficent detail to allow evaluation of the adequacy of measures to minimize danger to persons both on-site and off-site.
(3) A description of the site and the surrounding area.
(4) A description of proposed operating and administrative procedures relating to safeguards against radioactive hazards.
(5) A description of plans for dealing with acts or accidents which
might create radioactive hazards.
(6) Meteorological, hydrological, geological, and seismological
data necessary for evaluating measures prepared for protecting the
public against radioactive hazards.
(7) An evaluation of proposed measures and devices to prevent
acts or accidents which would create radioactive hazards or to
protect against the consequences should such acts or accidents occur.
34. 68 Stat. 948 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(i) (Supp. V, 1958).
35. 10 C.F.R. § 50.1-.110 (Supp. 1958).
36. Id. at § 50.33.

37. It should be noted that the financial qualifications of the applicant are
of great significance from the reactor safety standpoint. Shortly after enactment of the 1954 Act, its principal author, Rep. W. Sterling Cole, who was
chairman of the Joint Committee during the 83rd Congress, stated that data
on an applicant's financial qualifications might be required by AEC "since
construction or operation of a reactor under financial distress might induce
the owner to take dangerous shortcuts leading to hazardous conditions." Cole,
Licensing Nuclear Facilities, NucLEoNics 29 (Feb. 1955). Other members of
the Joint Committee have also stressed that financial qualifications are intimately connected with safety determinations. Hearings, supra note 17, at
107-08.
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(8) A description of procedures for disposal of radioactive wastes.
(9) A description of means for sampling radioactive stock discharges.
The regulations do not spell out the manner in which these data will
be considered by the AEC or the specific criteria by which the safety
determinations will be made. In general, the regulations in effect
merely repeat or paraphrase the statute, in specifying the standards
or criteria for determining whether a license or construction permit
should issue. Insofar as reactor safety is concerned, the regulations
specify that a license or construction permit will be granted if:
(a) The processes to be performed, the operating procedures, the
facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals in regard to any of the foregoing collectively
provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will comply with the
regulations in this chapter, including the regulations in Part 20, and that
the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.
(b) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in
the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations....
(c) The issuance of a license to the applicant will not, in the opinion of
the Commission, be inimical ...

to the health and safety of the public.38

The regulations also follow very closely, but somewhat expand upon,
the statutory language concerning conversion of a construction permit
to a license. In essence the conversion will be automatic in the absence
of good cause shown to the contrary, upon completion of construction
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit, "subject to
'39
any necessary testing of the facility for health or safety purposes.
Although section 182 explicitly requires license applicants to state
technical specifications which will become a part of the license or
construction permit,40 AEC regulations appear to be somewhat more
lenient in providing that the AEC "may require the applicant to
designate those provisions of his hazards summary report ...

which

he proposes be incorporated as technical specifications," and that the
AEC will indicate to the applicant which provisions of the hazards
38. 10 C.F.R. § 50.40 (Supp. 1958). This provision contains the basic standards for determinations that a license will be issued. Another provision,
10 C.F.R. § 50.45 (Supp. 1958), says that a construction permit will be issued
where the application is in conformity with and acceptable under the criteria
for issuance of a license. It should be noted that the quoted material includes
a reference to the regulations in part 20. Part 20 defines quite explicitly the
maximum exposures to radiation which AEC will permit as a consequence of
activities under its licenses, and establishes certain procedures and requirements for guarding against excessive radiation exposure. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1-.601
(Supp. 1958). In this sense the AEC's standards and criteria are well-defined,
but the real question in reactor safety is to provide reasonable assurance that
these limitations will not be violated through an accident of some kind.
39. 10 C.F.R. § 50.56 (Supp. 1958). The "subject to" clause is, of course, a
further indication that the AEC does regard the conversion of the permit to
a license as being completely automatic.
40. 68 Stat. 953 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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summary report will be deemed to become part of the license or
41
permit as technical specifications.
Although the above provisions of AEC regulations are set forth as
though they have a present reality and effectiveness, the fact of the
matter is that for the most part the AEC presently regards the foregoing standards as inapplicable and uses a rather different set of rules.
This situation results from the fact that reactor technology is still in
its infancy, and most reactors for which licenses are sought are still in
the developmental stage. This means that even though immediate
construction of the reactor may be sought by the applicant, the precise
design characteristics of the reactor have not yet been finally determined and, indeed, it may be still necessary to perform some experimental work, including reactor safety experiments.& 2 The AEC has
decided as a matter of policy (although there is no explicit statutory
basis for this) that rather than delay construction and operation of
reactors43 until design details are made final and until all of the
safety questions have been definitively answered, it will issue construction permits under certain circumstances notwithstanding these
uncertainties. 44
The basis for such action is found in section 50.35 of the AEC's
regulations which is inconspicuously headed Extended Time for
Providing Technical Information. This provision states that:
Where, because of the nature of a proposed project, an applicant is not in
a position to supply initially all of the technical information otherwise
required . .. the Commission may . .. issue a construction permit on a
41. 10 C.F.R. § 50.36 (Supp. 1958).
42. As the AEC General Manager put it: "In this era of experimentation
and development, the same factors which make it impossible for us to prepare
standards and codes, also, with few exceptions, make it essentially impossible
for the reactor designer to submit a complete hazard summary report at an
early stage in his planning. Adequate hazard evaluation . . . can be made
only on the basis of detailed and exact design specifications and operating
procedures. The power reactors that are being considered today are still
being developed." Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on Government Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1956).
43. The justification for this is the assumed importance in the national
interest of rapid development of nuclear power.
44. The AEC General Manager continued (from the testimony quoted in note
42 supra): "We recognized this state of affairs in our regulations and made
provisions under which we could issue provisional construction permits prior
to the time when we had all of the technical information needed to issue one
with no conditions.... The applicant may submit the results of his hazard
evaluation step by step as a series of preliminary hazard summary reports....
Such a permit is, of course, conditional and will not convert to a license to
operate until the complete hazard summary report has been submitted, and
we have made a finding based thereon that the final design of the specific
facility provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
will not be endangered by operation of the reactor in accordance with specified
procedures." Hearings,supra note 42 at 62-63. Query, however, whether such
a "conditional" permit is any more conditional than a permit issued "with no
conditions." See note 30 supra, and text at note 39 supra.
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provisional basis without the omitted information .. if the Commission
is satisfied that it has sufficient information to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be c6nstructed and
operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and
safety of the public and that the omitted information will be supplied... .45

Thus, under this provision, the AEC need not make a finding that a
particular reactor with specific safety features can be built and
operated at a particular site with reasonable assurance that the public
health and safety will not be endangered. Rather, the AEC will permit
construction under a provisional construction permit if it finds reasonable assurance that a reactor "of the general type proposed" can be
safely operated at the proposed site. Such a construction permit is,
of course, made provisional, subject to subsequent submission of the
data omitted from the application and final AEC approval of the final
design.46 The AEC has indicated that all construction permits for
power demonstration reactors under section 104(b), and "even for
many research, testing, and medical reactors" will be of this provisional nature for several years. 47 Use of the provisional construction
permit means, among other things, that technical specifications will
most probably not be incorporated in the permit upon its issuance,
although some may be incorporated from time to time as construction
proceeds. 48 In all probability a provisional construction permit will
remain provisional until construction is completed and will then be
converted directly into an operating license without ever having been
a straight "unprovisional" permit of the kind contemplated in section
185.
The distinction between the regular construction permit and the
provisional construction permit has some interesting implications.
The unconditional permit constitutes an approval by the AEC of the
actual detailed design characteristics and safeguards of the reactor,
so that even if conversion to an operating license were not automatic,
a heavy burden would rest with the AEC if it had qualms about converting the permit into an operating license. The provisional permit,
on the other hand, means only that the AEC is satisfied that a reactor
of the general type proposed can be safely operated at the proposed
location, and that such uncertainties as may exist can and will be
favorably resolved as design and construction move forward. The
applicant assumes the risk, however, that as new information is
developed and new experiments are performed, the AEC may conclude that the reactor is not suitable for safe operation at the location
45. 10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (Supp. 1958).
46. These regulations reflect the substance of what was described in note
44 supra.
47. Hearings,supra note 42, at 63.
48. See text at note 108 infra.
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at which it is constructed. The AEC has clearly reserved the privilege
49
in any such case of refusing to convert the permit into a license.
The provisional permit does have some advantages to the applicant.
It means that the AEC has approved the site in the sense that further
information about the site "will not in itself have any bearing on
the conversion of the permit to a license;"5 0 it means also that construction may proceed and that the applicant's financial and technical qualifications are approved; and, finally, it means that the applicant will receive fuel for operating the reactor during the life of the
license.51
SAFETY DETERMINATIONS: THE PROCEDURE

Until enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the problem of
location and safety of reactors was entirely a government problem.
The AEC decided what reactors it wanted to construct, where they
should be located, and what safety features should be built into them.
To assist the Commission in this task, an advisory committee 52 known
as the Reactor Safeguard Committee was established in 1947 to provide a panel of recognized experts to review safety studies made by
AEC contractors on proposed reactors and to submit recommendations
to the Commission. 53 Subsequently the AEC established an Industrial
Committee on Reactor Location Problems to "balance the technical
and safety aspects of reactor hazards as determined by the Reactor
Safeguards Committee against nontechnical aspects giving consideration to such matters as the social and economic impact on adjacent
communities.
...
5" These two advisory committees were merged
into the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in July, 1953. 5
49. In one case, that of the application of Power Reactor Development Company (see text at note 62 infra), AEC transmitted the construction permit to
PRDC with a letter stating in part: "[T]he Commission wants it to be clearly
understood that in issuing this construction permit the emphasis is on the fact
that it is a conditional one and that the Commission can make no commitment
to convert the permit to a license until it is satisfied on all safety matters."
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 8TH CONG., IST SEss,, A STUDY OF AEC
PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION IN THE LICENSING OF REACTOR FAciLTIEs
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(Comm. Print, 1957).
50. Testimony of the General Manager, Hearings, supra note 42, at 64. Dr.
Frank Pittman, then Deputy Director of AEC's Division of Civilian Applications, stated in 1956 that the provisional construction permit would be issued
"at such time as the Commission has become satisfied that the location proposed is suitable for the type and size of the reactor proposed." CCH ATOMIC
ENERGY L. REP. f 6601 (1956).
51. Hearings, supra note 42, at 63.
52. The AEC's advisory committees are established pursuant to § 161 (a)
of the act. 68 Stat. 948 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
53. 11 AEC SEMIANN. REP. 143 (1952).
54. 12 AEC SEmI-NN. REP. 7 (1952). This committee came into existence
primarily to deal with the problem of whether or not AEC should release from
restriction certain lands known as the Wahluke Slope which had been
regarded a potentially hazardous area because of the operations of reactors at
AEC's Hanford plant in the State of Washington.
55. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, supra note

49, at 27.

1958 ]

THE LAW OF REACTOR SAFETY

This new Advisory Committee has come to be the most powerful and
influential group in connection with matters of reactor safety.56
During the pre-1954 act period, the proponent of a reactor, usually
a major AEC contractor, would develop detailed plans and designs
for the reactor and would submit a hazards study to the Advisory
Committee. The Committee would usually meet with the proponent
of the reactor and other interested persons in what was in effect an
informal hearing on the safety considerations. The Advisory Committee, if not completely satisfied as to the hazards report, would
make helpful suggestions or criticisms, and might request further
data. Finally when fully satisfied as to the safety of the reactor, it
would give its approval in the form of a letter to the Commission.
Persuading the Advisory Committee of the safety of a reactor was
universally regarded as the major and most significant hurdle to be
overcome in obtaining a safety determination. All efforts of the
reactor proponent in this connection were pointed towards the submission or presentation to the Advisory Committee. So far as is known,
the Committee's consideration of these cases was not based on any
formalized procedures or standards, but the cases were apparently
57
considered in the light of various informal, unpublished criteria.
After the 1954 act became law and the AEC commenced receiving
applications from private parties for reactor licenses, the preexisting
procedures were adapted to handle the new type of case, although the
AEC recognized that it would have to build up a full time reactor
hazards staff of its own and did in fact establish a hazards evaluation
staff, which in 1955 became the Hazards Evaluation Branch of the
Division of Licensing and Regulation. 58 The Hazards Evaluation
Branch works closely and informally with license applicants, even
before license applications are filed, in advising and assisting them on
both substantive and procedural matters relating to safety of their
contemplated reactor.59 After the application is filed, the hazards
56. Former AEC Chairman Strauss has given "much credit" for the AEC's
"extraordinary reactor safety record" to the "strict criteria laid down by
our Reactor Safeguards Committee." Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy
Industry, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1955). Similarly, the Joint Committee has
stated that one of the main factors in reactor safety has been the "great
prestige" of the Reactor Safeguards Committee. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1957).
57. See Chairman Strauss' reference to the "strict criteria" laid down by
the ACRS note 56 supra. "At the present time there are no standards or
criteria for reactor safeguards in the United States.... Nevertheless there are
standards (or criteria) which are actually being used" by those charged with
responsibility for reactor safety determinations. McCullough, The Experience
in the United States With Reactor Operation and Reactor Safeguards, U.N. No.
1551, Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy (1958).
58. JOINT COMMJITTEE ON ATOmIC ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 111-12.
59. Id. at 106.
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evaluation staff works with the applicant in bringing the hazards
summary report portion of the application to that degree of completeness which will warrant a submission to and a formal discussion with
the Advisory Committee.60 As in the case of AEC-owned reactors sponsored by contractors, the presentation to the Committee is the
culmination of the preliminary reactor safety efforts. This presentation is informal in nature and the proceedings are not public. 61 The
Committee then submits its findings and determinations on the reactor
to the Commission, and it becomes a basis for the Commission's final
determination whether a construction permit should be issued.
Initially, the entire procedure as outlined above was conducted by
AEC in an atmosphere of semi-secrecy. The license applications,
including the hazards reports submitted by the applicant, were made
public by placing them in the AEC's public document room. The
interested public did not, however, have the benefit of any official
appraisal of the safety characteristics except the AEC's ultimate determination recited in the text of the construction permit that there was
"reasonable assurance" as to safety. Neither the findings of the Advisory Committee nor the specific findings of the Hazards Evaluation
Branch reached the public eye.
This situation was altered as a result of the proceeding in Power
2 This case involved
Reactor Development Company (PRDC).6
a
complicated, multi-faceted issue which can be stated in essence from
the safety standpoint in the following manner: The Commission issued a provisional construction permit6 3 to PRDC notwithstanding

the conclusion of the Advisory Committee that substantial experimental and theoroetical work remained to be performed before it
could be concluded that a reactor of the type proposed could be safely
operated at the proposed site,64 and the Commission's own findings of
"uncertainty" as to the hazards potential of this type of reactor and
60. Id. at 107. The hazards evaluation staff has primary responsibility for

safety determinations, and under AEC's present procedures cases will not be
referred to the Advisory Committee "where the hazards considerations are
fairly well established or where the modifications to existing reactors are
such as to introduce little, if any, potential additional hazards." Id. at 112. The
hazards evaluation staff apparently, however, informally "discusses the
safety aspects of the reactor with its advisors (ACRS)." Id. at 107.
61. It is common knowledge in the nuclear industry that the Advisory Committee goes to great pains to avoid any formalization of its meetings or anything approaching "on the record" proceedings. Strangely inconsistent with
this, however, is the statement of Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, Chairman of
the Committee in August 1955, at a public meeting in New York City. He
stated that Committee meetings on civilian reactors are open, and invited
the audience to attend such meetings. Atomic Industrial Forum, A Forum
Report: Atomic Energy-A Realistic Appraisal 191 (1955).
62. AEC Docket No. F-16.
63. See note 49 supra.
64. The text of the Advisory Committee report may be found at JOINT
COMMITTEE owr ATomic ENERGY, note

49 supra,at 133.
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its failure to find that there was "reasonable assurance that [a reactor]
of the general type proposed can be constructed and operated at the
proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public."6 Issuance of this construction permit led to considerable
political wrangling and to formal intervention in the licensing proceedings by three international unions, who contended primarily that
the construction permit was issued contrary to the statute and to the
66
AEC's own regulations.
Largely as a result of its experience in the PRDC case, and the
concomitant furor, the AEC subsequently revised its procedures so
as to provide for limited public disclosure of its safety determinations.
Under these revisions, the AEC would not issue a construction permit
without either ordering a hearing on the application or issuing notice
of its intent to issue or deny the construction permit. 67 Where notice
of intent is issued (which is the course the AEC consistently followed),
the revised AEC procedures called for the appending to the AEC's
notice of a memorandum prepared by the Division of Licensing and
Regulation setting forth the salient facts and major factors considered in the case.6 Insofar as concerns safety, this memorandum was
based on the findings and conclusions of the Hazards Evaluation
Branch. In addition, the AEC indicated that it would endeavor to
rely to a greater extent upon its own Reactor Hazards Branch for
advice and decisions on specific reactor safety problems, and that
ultimately it would call upon the Advisory Committee for assistance
on only the more difficult specific cases, and for assistance in estab69
lishing overall safety standards and criteria.
These revised procedures did not, however, satisfy the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which pressed for and obtained enactment
in 1957 of an amendment to the 1954 act which (1) established the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards as a statutory committee
with statutory responsibility to "review safety studies and facility
license applications referred to it and ... make reports thereon ....
advise the Commission with regard to the hazards of proposed or
existing reactor facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety
standards, and... perform such other duties as the Commission may
request; '7 0 (2) required that the Advisory Committee review each
65. See construction permit, id. at 122. It should be noted also that the
permit was issued despite PRDC's failure to submit sufficient evidence to
enable a finding as to its financial qualifications. Ibid. See note 37 supra.
66. The construction permit was issued on August 4, 1956. AEC granted
leave to intervene on October 8, 1956. The case is now before the members of
the Commission awaiting decision. For a summary of the PRDC case, see
CCH ATOIuc ENERGY L. REP. ff 11201.
67. Jonq Comw=r EE oN ATomic ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 110.
68. Ibid.
69. See note 60 supra.
70. 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (Supp. V, 1958).
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application for a commercial license under section 103, for a demonstration license under section 104(b), or for a testing reactor license
under section 104 (c), as well as any other cases specifically referred
to it by AEC;71 (3) required that the report of the Advisory Committee
be made public as a part of the record of the hearing; 72 and (4) required that a hearing be held on every license application under
section 103 or section 104(b) and on every license application for a
testing reactor under section 104 (c).73
These amendments are clearly intended to compel the AEC to
bring reactor safety problems out into the open so that the interested
public may have a better idea as to questions of safety in the construction and operation of reactors.74 Neither the amendments nor the
AEC's implementing regulations have, however, altered the procedures followed by the Advisory Committee. Despite the new statutory role of the Committee in the administrative process, the proceedings before it are still off the record. 75 This means that, although the
Advisory Committee's report which is made public is probably the
most important single element upon which the final safety determination of the Commission is based, there is no mechanism through which
a party can attack the basis for the report.
Following issuance of the construction permit, it is expected that
the license applicant will continue to furnish safety data to AEC
during the construction phase.7 6 This is particularly true in those
cases in which the construction permit is issued provisionally with
substantial hazards report material omitted. Newly submitted data
will be reviewed by the Hazards Evaluation Branch, but it is not clear
to what extent there will be further submissions to the Advisory
Committee. Similarly, it is not clear to what extent the AEC will
take formal administrative action during the construction phase. It
would undoubtedly be to the advantage of the applicant to obtain
AEC approval of various phases of its work as it goes along, if for no
other reason than to avoid substantial expenditures on particular
courses of action which may not be approved by AEC. There are a
number of ways in which the applicant may handle this problem. The
AEC's regulations and the construction permits themselves invite
submission of additional data and reports from time to time as they
become available. Such data may be submitted for the AEC's information only, or they may be submitted in the form of an amendment to
71. 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
72. Ibid.
73. 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
74. As the Joint Committee put it: "[W]hen the public is adequately and
accurately informed ...it will be in a better position to accept the construction of any reactors." S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1957).
75. See note 61 supra.
76. JOINT COMBrTTEE ow AToMIc ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 107.
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the license application which, it will be recalled, remains in a pending
status during construction. In general, the AEC has not taken formal
action on such post-construction permit amendments to the application unless action is specifically requested by the applicant. From the
applicant's standpoint, amendments to the application indicating the
development of new data or a change in design plans strengthen its
position and impose a heavier burden of proof on the AEC if the AEC
wishes to raise safety questions at a later date, since the construction
permit specifies that design and construction are to be in accordance
with the license application and amendments thereto. 7 The applicant
might, of course, be in an even stronger position if the AEC did
affirmatively approve the amendments to the application, but to
request AEC approval incurs some risk that the AEC may require a
hearing, that other parties may intervene, or that approval may be
denied.
Another option which the applicant has is to request that the construction permit be amended so as to incorporate technical specifications. Such action by the AEC would impose an even heavier burden on
it subsequently to question on safety grounds the features covered
by the technical specifications. Thus in one case, that of the Common8
the applicant subwealth Edison Dresden Nuclear Power Station,7
mitted the Enclosure Section of the Final Hazards Summary Report,
on the basis of which the AEC added a technical specification to the
construction permit giving final approval to the reactor containment
building. In this case, however, the AEC gave formal Federal Register
notice of its intention to amend the construction permit and announced
that a hearing would be held on the amendment in the event of a
79
proper intervention.
It should be recognized that there is really never any definite
assurance, whether the construction permit is provisional or not, that
it will automatically be converted into an operating license.3 0 The
AEC is responsible for holding a hearing on the issuance of the operating license, and even at this late date it must determine that the
operation of the reactor is safe. In reaching this decision the AEC
must consider not only the technical design features of the reactor,
but also any new basic scientific data which may suggest that some of
the safety assumptions are perhaps -not valid. And even beyond
these considerations, there remain the legal uncertainties bred by sec77. The AEC's construction permits have been issued in a fairly standardized
form, but the form has undergone considerable evolution. The form now used
by AEC for major reactors authorizes the applicant to "proceed to design
and construct a facility of the general design concept set forth in the application and amendments thereto without further authorization."
78. AEC Docket No. 50-10.
79. 23 Fed. Reg. 1060 (1958).
80. See note 30 supra.
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tion 183 (d) of the act which makes every license "subject to . . .all
of the other provisions of this chapter, now or hereafter in effect and
to all valid rules and regulations of the Commission," 81 and by section
187 which specifies that licenses are subject to modification "by reason
of amendments of this chapter or by reason of rules and regulations
'82
issued in accordance with the terms of this chapter.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Although there seems to be a general recognition that specific
standards and criteria for reactor safety are desirable,3 very little
progress has been made to date in formulating them. This means
that designers of reactor systems are required to build safety factors
into the selection of site and the specific design features of the reactor
without any firm conception of the standards which must be met. It
means also that they have very little practical protection against any
possible arbitrary action on the part of the AEC. Thus, as a practical
matter, a license applicant must acquiesce in whatever safety measures
the AEC may order, regardless of cost, and regardless of whether or
not the requirement seems reasonable.
In large part the absence of definite standards is attributable to the
fact that the industry is still in the developmental stage, and also to
the fact that many of the technical questions have not yet been answered with the certainty necessary to translate these answers into
definitive standards.8 4 Finally, there has been serious concern lest the
premature development of quantitative standards stifle the growth of
the nuclear industry.85
81. 68 Stat. 954 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2233 (Supp. V, 1958).

82. 68 Stat. 955 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2237 (Supp. V, 1958).
83. As early as 1955, Dr. McCullough, Chairman of the Advisory Committee
took cognizance of industry's desire for a "code so all you would have to do is
open the book and find out if you comply with these regulations." Atomic Industrial Forum, supra note 61, at 176. Although he indicated then that work
on developing standards was contemplated, he testified in May, 1958, that the
AEC and the Advisory Committee have not yet "come to grips with specific
standards." HearingsBefore the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Operation of AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1958).
84. Dr. McCullough has stated that "a discussion of the unknowns in
reactor safety could be lengthy indeed." Among the unknowns to which he
referred are: nuclear properties of reactor cores, many aspects of which are
known only empirically and cannot be predicted on a theoretical basis; the
properties of steel and other metals for nuclear plants; the effect of radiation
on reactor materials; the reaction of water with other reactor materials such
as aluminum, zirconium, uranium, and thorium; effects of radiation on life;
problems of avoiding catastrophe in the event of a major reactor accident;
etc. McCullough, Reactor Safety, NucLEOmcs 134, 136 (Sept. 1957).
85. "I do want to warn you, sir, that it is dangerous to come to numerical
values of these standards too soon because we might stifle the industry."
Testimony of Dr. McCullough, Hearings,note 83 supra, at 57. Dr. McCullough
has no objection, however, to "writing such standards as long as it is clearly
recognized that they are tentative and interim and must be modified as our
knowledge of the field increases." McCullough, The Experience in the United
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Some conclusions on the substantive law of reactor safety can be
drawn by considering the actions taken by the AEC on specific license
applications. Since the 1954 act became law, more than seventy applications to construct, acquire, or operate reactors have been submitted
to the AEC. It is possible, through analysis of the license applications,
the hazards reports submitted by the applicants, and the AEC's actions
and memoranda on these cases, to infer some precedents and principles concerning the substantive law of reactor safety.86
Most of the seventy-odd applications considered by the AEC have
involved research reactors. These reactors are generally small in
size and power and, although they do involve potential hazards to
individuals in the immediate vicinity, their catastrophe potential is
not great. AEC consideration of these applications is, therefore, not
particularly enlightening from the standpoint of ascertaining the
substantive considerations involved in safety determinations for the
larger, more socially significant reactors. These would be primarily
power reactors and test reactors. To date the AEC has considered and
acted on five applications for power reactors and three applications
87
for test reactors.
It is clear, for the present at least, that the major problem in reactor
safety from the standpoint of administrative law is the issuance of
the construction permit. In considering whether or not a construction
permit should be issued, the AEC really considers the entire range of
safety problems and reaches a basic decision as to whether or not the
reactor is safe. To date there is little precedent available as to the
conversion of the construction permits for major reactors into operating licenses, 88 but it now seems likely that once the reactor is constructed in accordance with the construction permit, reactor safety
considerations will tend to relate only to matters of detail and
operating procedure. These matters continue to be extremely important from the standpoint of the health and safety of the public, but
they are highly technical and individualized in nature and will probably arise and be resolved in sequence. Thus, after construction of
the reactor, the applicant will probably seek a license to operate the
States with Reactor Operation and Reactor Safeguards, U.N. No. 1551, Second
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (1958).
86. In only one of these cases will there be law developed on the basis of a
decision in an adversary case. This is, of course, the PRDC case.
87. The power reactor applicants are Commonwealth Edison Company
(Dresden Nuclear Power Station) (Docket No. 50-10); Consolidated Edison
Co. (Docket No.'50-3); General Electric Co. (Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor) (Docket No. 50-18); Power Reactor Development Co. (Docket No.
F-16); and Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Docket No. 50-29). In the case of
the General Electric Co.'s application, a facility license has already been
issued. The test reactor applicants are General Electric Company (Docket
No. 50-70); National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (Docket No. 50-30);
and Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Docket No. F-22).
88. The General Electric Co. case (Docket No. 50-18) is the only precedent.
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reactor for test operation in certain definite stages, proceeding from
cautious, extremely conservative operation at the outset to normal,
and perhaps somewhat experimental nature later on as each previous
step is taken in a successful manner, or appropriate modifications
made.89 It seems rather unlikely at this moment that any significant
body of precedent as to substantive safety law on reactor operating
techniques will develop within the foreseeable future. At least, there
is no such body of precedent now. Accordingly, the following discussion is limited to safety aspects of construction permits.
Neither the 1954 act nor the AEC's regulations explicitly requires
a construction permit as a prerequisite to construction of a reactor.
Rather, the statute and the regulations merely make it unlawful to
"manufacture, produce ...

,

acquire, (or) possess" a reactor without

an AEC license. 90 Although this language may be sufficiently broad
to embrace a prohibition against unlicensed "construction," 91 the
AEC has never given any clear indication as to its view of what constitutes "construction" of a reactor: i.e., does "construction" commence when the land is cleared? When the excavation is begun?
When the reactor containment building is erected? Or only when the
reactor itself is assembled? In any event, the question may be academic since it is not likely that persons desiring to build a reactor, or
at least a large reactor, would risk money even in clearing and excavating at the chosen site without first obtaining AEC's approval in
92
the form of a construction permit.
The problem of site is closely related to the problems of the hazards
embodied in the reactor itself, the safeguards against such hazards
89. The General Electric Company has approached the problem in this
manner in its power reactor license. As a consequence, it has to date filed
more than twenty-five amendments to its license application as it has passed
from one stage to another.
90. See text at note 13 supra. AEC's regulations merely repeat the statutory language on this point.
91. It seems rather unlikely, however, that these words could be interpreted
so as to embrace clearing of land, excavation, and erection of a building in
which the reactor is to be placed, as opposed to actual fabrication or assembly
of the reactor itself. Unquestionably the AEC has clear statutory authority
explicitly to prohibit such construction without a construction permit.
92. In at least one case, a license applicant apparently completed construction of a reactor before the construction permit was issued. In this case,
(AEC Docket No. 50-99), the applicant filed its license application on March
27, 1958, to construct and operate a research reactor. Two months later it urged
AEC to expedite action since "according to our schedule the facility will be
completed and ready for the introduction of special nuclear material (i.e.,
fuel) as early as July 1, 1958, or as late as July 15, 1958." A month later,
June 26, 1958, the applicant again pleaded for prompt AEC action since, it
said, the reactor "will be ready for inspection on July 14, 1958." The construction permit was finally issued on September 4, 1958, and recited the earliest
completion date as September 4 and the latest completion date as October 15.
The operating license was issued one day after the construction permit, on
September 5, 1958, and recited that the reactor was constructed in accordance
with the terms of the construction permit. There is no indication that AEC
regarded anything in this case as a violation of the 1954 act.
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built into the reactor, and the nature of the building in which the
reactor is contained. For example, if the applicant placed a reactor
within a structure which would clearly and absolutely contain the
consequences of any conceivable mishap, or if the reactor itself were
clearly and absolutely incapable of producing a significant accident,
the reactor could safely be located in a highly populated area. On the
other hand, an otherwise inherently hazardous reactor could conceivably be located in the middle of a desert without any containment
at all.

93

At one time the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety applied an
informal rule of thumb-a formula for location of a reactor based on
its power level. This formula was apparently adequate for siting AECowned reactors at AEC installations, but if applied to privately owned
power-producing reactors would necessitate location of the reactors at
points uneconomically distant from the area served. Thus, of necessity, emphasis shifted to a common sense determination of safety
based upon all of the many variable factors which pertain to the
safety of a reactor. The principal factors considered are discussed
below.
Does the reactor design afford sufficient assurance that accidents
which might give rise to hazards will not occur?94 This involves a
consideration of the stability characteristics of the specific reactor
type, the adequacy of controls and instrumentation, the safeguards
against loss of coolant, the manner in which the reactor will be operated, etc. In most of the cases to date, the AEC has had at the time
of issuing the construction permit only a generalized set of data as
to the reactor design, since specific design decisions were awaiting
research and development or experimental work. The principal factor
in the AEC's consideration of these matters seems to have been the
prior experience with reactors of a similar type. Thus in most of the
cases in which the AEC has issued construction permits, it had some
assurance based on previous successful and safe operation of ancestral
reactors of the same general type, that a reactor of such a type could
be built so as to operate safely. For example, in issuing construction
permits to General Electric Company for its Vallecitos Boiling Water
Reactor and to the Commonwealth Edison Company for its Dresden
Nuclear Power Station, the AEC placed reliance upon "the successful
93. Dr. McCullough stated in 1956 at a Press Round Table on Reactor Safety:
"(T]heoretically, you could build any reactor anywhere if you want to spend
enough money and work the design in. . . ." Atomic Industrial Forum, A
Forum Report: Management, Economics and Technology for the Atomic Industry, No. 1, 169, 176 (1956).

94. Quoting Dr. McCullough again: "We must recognize that the only way

to be absolutely safe is not to build a reactor at all .... [L]et me warn you
that we must expect accidents. Much as I would like to, I cannot believe we
can be wise enough to avoid all accidents completely." Id. at 173.
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operation of two separate boiling water reactor experiments at Argonne National Laboratory. 95 Similarly, in issuing the construction
permit to Consolidated Edison Company and to Yankee Atomic Electric Company for pressurized water systems, the AEC could rely upon
favorable experience with the Nautilus submarine reactor. Again,
in issuing a permit to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for a test reactor which "for all practical purposes is identical to
the MTR at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho," the AEC
relied upon more than four years of successful operation of the MTR.90
Finally, in issuing a permit for a test reactor to General Electric
Company the AEC based its decision in point on its finding that the
97
technology of the proposed reactor is "fairly well understood."
98
On the other hand, in one case the AEC issued a construction
permit notwithstanding the Advisory Committee's conclusion that
"much information relative to the basic performance of this reactor
is not known, and that several specific problems.., must be satisfactorily solved before anyone would have assurance that operation
would be safe," and its opinion that previous experience with this
type of reactor "is not wholly reassuring." 99 The Commission issued
the permit on the basis of its belief that the unresolved safety problems "will prove to be of u a° kind that can be satisfactorily resolved
within a reasonable time."'
What is the maximum credible accident which can result despite all
safeguards? "Maximum credible accident" is a term of art which in
essence means
those conditions or combination of conditions whose occurrence is
considered credible and for which the consequences appear to be greater
than those for any other credible accident.lo'
The "maximum credible accident" is something less than the "maximum possible accident" which is a "combination of inadvertent and
deliberate actions which could cause mechanical, chemical, or nuclear
events to take place with an energy release sufficiently great to
release all or most of the fission products contained in the reactor,"
the probability of which combinations occurring is "so vanishingly
COMMITTEE ON AToMIc ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 165.
96. CCH AToMac ENERGY L. REP. 9 11213.
97. CCH AToomc ENERGY L. REP. ff 11207.

95. JoiT

98. PRDC, AEC Docket No. F-16.
99. Jon= CommITE

oN ATozmc ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 133.

100. Id. at 122. Chairman Strauss characterized the type of reactor which
PRDC proposed to construct as "the most hazardous of all reactors." Hearings,
note 32 supra,at 239.
101. Notice of proposed issuance of construction permit to Yankee Atomic
Electric Co., 22 Fed. Reg. 6258 (1957).
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small ... as to make it reasonable to assume that, for all practical
purposes, they are not possible."'10 2
Although the AEC's regulations do not expressly require this, the
AEC has in its handling of applications required the applicant to
submit a descriptive and quantitative analysis of what the applicant
considers to be the maximum credible accident and the consequences
of this accident to the health and safety of the public. 103 It appears,
however, that the AEC will on occasion issue a construction permit
even if it is not completely satisfied that the maximum credible accident postulated by the applicant is valid. For example, the Consolidated Edison construction permit was issued in May, 1956, but as
late as April, 1958, the AEC was not satisfied that either the magnitude
or the consequences of the maximum credible accident for this reactor
had been established.1° 4 Similarly, the AEC issued a permit to Westinghouse Company for construction of a test reactor despite its
dissatisfaction with the maximum credible accident postulated by
the applicant, although satisfaction was expressed that when such
accident is defined "it will be feasible to contain it."105 In the PRDC
case, the construction permit was issued despite doubt as to the
magnitude of the maximum credible accident and further doubt as to
whether such an accident might breach the containment structure. 0 6
On the other hand, it is quite clear that both the Advisory Committee and the AEC would insist upon being completely satisfied as
to the maximum credible accident before permitting operation of the
reactor and, indeed, before giving final approval to (i.e., designating as
a technical specification) the containment structure design proposed
07
by the applicant.
Will the building in which the reactor is enclosed contain the consequences of the maximum credible accident? This question relates to
whether or not the walls of the structure will be breached by an explosion in the reactor or by the propulsion of missiles (i.e., pieces of the
reactor system) against the walls. It also relates to the question
whether, assuming the structure is not breached and the fission products released from the reactor are contained in the building, there
will be any hazardous leakage of radiation from the structure. In
102. Ibid.
103. Occasionally an applicant, for reasons best known to itself, avoids the
use of the phrase "maximum credible accident," and uses alternative formulations. For example, in the Commonwealth Edison case, supra note 87, the
concept "worst reasonable accident" was used.
104. Letter from AEC to Consolidated Edison, April 24, 1958.
105. 22 Fed. Reg. 152, 154 (1958).
106. The Advisory Committee was not satisfied that "no credible supercriticality accident resulting from meltdown could breach the container."
JOINT CoMIrTEE oN ATOmVc ENERGY, note 49 supra, at 134.

107. Letter from AEC to Consolidated Edison, April 24, 1958.
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those cases in which construction permits are issued without the AEC's
being satisfied as to the maximum credible accident, it obviously cannot be satisfied with the containment. Even in those cases in which the
maximum credible accident is accepted by the AEC upon issuance of
a construction permit and the AEC believes the containment is adequate, there is some doubt that the applicant can obtain absolutely
binding approval of its containment design. This is vividly demonstrated in the case of the Commonwealth Edison construction permit
issued in May, 1956. The AEC issued an amendment to the construction permit in March, 1958, incorporating therein as a technical specification the design of the containment structure prepared by the applicant based upon the enclosure section of the applicant's final hazards
summary report. 1'8 The obvious purpose and advantage of having
the technical specification is to enable the applicant to invest in construction of the envelope without fear that the AEC may subsequently
find the containment inadequate. Nevertheless, even though the AEC
did approve an unqualified technical specification, the Hazards Evaluation Branch was not prepared to do so without reservation. Although
the Advisory Committee concluded that the maximum credible accident postulated by the applicant was the "most serious which might
occur" and that the proposed containment vessel would contain this
accident, and the AEC's Hazards Evaluation Branch stated that it
knew of "no condition which could lead to a credible accident with
more serious consequences" than that postulated by the applicant, the
Hazards Evaluation Branch concluded that the maximum credible
accident had not yet been "definitively established" and could not
be until the design of the reactor was complete. 109 Thus, despite the
technical specification, notice is served on the applicant that another
look will be given the containment after a definitive conclusion is
reached on the maximum credible accident based on the Hazards
Evaluation Branch's evaluation of the final detailed design.
Is the site suitable? There are two aspects to the question of site
suitability. The first of these concerns the effect of the site upon
operation of the reactor and its safety. This requires consideration
of the geology, seismology, hydrology, and meteorology of the area.
It would be obviously undesirable, for example, to locate a large
reactor in an area subject to heavy earthquakes or in an area which
might be subject to flooding. It is necessary also that these environmental factors be such as not to compound the normal hazards of
operation. For example, the weather and water conditions should
be conducive to harmless dispersion of radioactive effluents and wastes
108. 23 Fed. Reg. 1060 (1958).
109. 23 Fed. Reg. 1060 (1958).
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rather than to concentration of these in places where they can be
hazardous.
As pointed out above, the issuance of the construction permit, even
the provisional construction permit, signifies that the AEC regards
the site in itself as satisfactory in the sense that no further information
concerning environmental factors will have a bearing on ultimate
conversion of the construction permit into an operating license.110
Anomalously, however, the AEC has issued major construction permits despite the absence of complete information as to these environmental factors. Indeed, in some cases, this data has been little more
than skeletal or fragmentary."' Apparently the AEC regards this
type of data as being technical information within the scope of section
50.35 of its regulations, which the applicant "is not in a position to
supply initially ... because of the nature of the project," and which
may be submitted after issuance of the provisional construction
permit. It would appear, however, that such data is beyond the scope
of the AEC's rationale 12 for the provisional construction permit, since
difficulties in bringing design of the reactor to finality because of the
developmental stage of the industry have no relationship to the
applicant's ability to compile and supply the necessary environmental
data.
The second aspect of this issue concerns the economic utilization and
population characteristics of the area likely to be affected in the event
there is a catastrophic accident. At this stage of nuclear technology,
when so much remains in the realm of the unknown, there remains the
feeling the large reactors should not be located in areas where, if the
worst happens, substantial damage to the community at large would
result. This feeling, of course, has had to be reconciled with the necessity for permitting power reactors to be placed in reasonably close
11 3
proximity to the areas which they will serve.
To date most of the applicants for reactor licenses have elected to
locate their reactors at sites not in close proximity to population centers. There have been two cases, however, in which the location of
a large reactor has been a cause for some concern. In the PRDC case,
the Advisory Committee was concerned about the location of a partic110. See text at note 50 supra.
111. PRDC, AEC Docket No. F-16.
112. As described in notes 42 and 44 supra.
113. Former AEC Chairman Strauss warned that "inevitably, as more and
more reactors are built and used, familiarity will breed some degree of
contempt for the dangers." Hearings,supra note 56, at 59. AEC Commissioner
Libby stated just a little over a year before he voted in favor of issuing the
PRDC construction permit that constructing such a reactor in a populated
area "requires that the safety of this type of reactor be determined experimentally" probably by "construction of a reasonably similar prototype in an
isolated area and the testing of this prototype to determine kinetic behavior."
Id. at 203.
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ularly esoteric reactor type, a fast breeder reactor, at a point which
included a population of 2,000,000 within a thirty-mile radius and a
population of almost 200,000 within a twenty-mile radius. The AEC
issued the provisional construction permit, going to great pains to
stress that it was conditional, on the theory that mere construction
presented no hazard, that all outstanding safety problems would be
satisfactorily resolved, that in any event the AEC would never license
operation of the reactor if it were not fully satisfied as to its safety,
and that delay in issuing the permit would be detrimental to the
4
national interest."
In the second case, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics11 5 proposed to construct a large test reactor at a site three miles

from Sandusky, Ohio, but in the direction of likely growth of that
city, the reactor to be in the center of a half-mile exclusion area with
the nearest residence 3,200 feet away from the reactor. The reactor
was to be used to test nuclear fuel-bearing components to destruction
or near-destruction, and this contemplated use so near a densely populated area was of special concern to the Advisory Committee.
The Committee concluded that the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics experimental program could be conducted in such a
restricted manner that no "appreciable hazard" to the public would
result, but expressed its apprehension that successful restricted operation of the reactor and the importance of the NACA program to the
national defense would lead to pressure to induce a "loosening of
restrictions." Accordingly the Committee, without actually disapproving the site, suggested that a site less close to a center of population
would be preferable. 116 The AEC nevertheless issued the construction
permit on a provisional basis. 117
One of the members of the Advisory Committee, Dr. Abel Wolman,
offered certain independent views. He stated that he would recommend against the site and expressed the view that the applicant
should be required to consider alternative sites. "I do not believe that
we should freeze on a site in a situation like this merely because the
applicant has chosen it."11 8 Dr. Wolman has on other occasions
suggested that actual construction at a particular site be deferred
until the safety problems are adequately resolved, or that in cases of
114. CCH ATormc ENERGY L. REP. 111
6775, 6824 (1956).
115. Government agencies desiring to construct and operate reactors are
required to obtain AEC construction permits and licenses to precisely the
same extent and in precisely the same manner as private persons.
116. Letter From C. Rogers McCullough, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, to AEC Chairman Strauss, Nov. 5, 1957.
117. 23 Fed. Reg. 5674 (1958).

118. Letter From C. Rogers McCullough, Chairman of the Advisory Committee to AEC Chairman Strauss, Nov. 5, 1957.
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doubt as to the site the applicant be required to justify his selection
of the doubtful site rather than of some alternative site." 9
It should be noted that the AEC's determination that a given reactor
at a given site is sufficiently safe to warrant its construction and
operation does not necessarily mean that AEC has concluded that no
one off the site can be injured. On the contrary, the AEC's safety
determinations have explicitly recognized that there may be some
injury to the health and safety of the public if the maximum credible
accident occurs in a licensed reactor. Thus, the AEC approved the
technical specifications for the containment structure of the Dresden
Nuclear Power Station, in the face of the Hazards Evaluation Branch
findings that the maximum credible accident would result in some
leakage of radioactivity which could cause some thyroid injury in a
small percentage of adults exposed for an eight hour period at the
site boundary and some risk of cancer of the thyroid in children
similarly exposed. 12 0 The question, therefore, is not whether or not
there is any risk to the health and safety of the public, but rather
whether the degree of risk is acceptable. Here again there are no
definite standards.
CONCLUSION

The above discussion is not, of course, a definitive evaluation,
analysis, and interpretation of the available precedent, but merely
a general assessment of the flavor and content of the precedents.
This general assessment suggests that the AEC's case by case, almost
ad hoc, approach to reactor safety has produced very little in the way
of a pattern and quite a bit in the way of confusion. There are nevertheless to be found within these materials the tools of advocacy.
To date the attorneys handling reactor safety problems have shown
a disinclination to be advocates in the routine licensing cases. The
tendency has been, at least insofar as concerns the material in the
public record, for the license applicant to acquiesce in the AEC's
determinations and suggestions rather than to resist them in the
sense of advocating lesser safeguards or standards as adequate. In
part this is attributable to the unknown elements of reactor technology
and to the necessity, from the public relations standpoint, of avoiding
119. Hearings,note 83 supra, at 58. Dr. Wolman, who is head of the Department of Sanitary Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, has said: "The
committee now functions on a given site submitted by the applicant. It has
always been my judgment that that site may be fortuitous for one reason or
another ....
I frequently am of the feeling that alternative site indications
should accompany the applicants (sic) report ....
I often find myself being
pushed into a corner of accepting a facility on a location which may or may
not be quite acceptable to me." Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy
Commission, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1958).
120. 23 Fed. Reg. 1060 (1958).
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responsibility for a possible catastrophe. It is to be expected, however,
that this timidity will decrease as the industry matures. In any event
the material now part of the public record provides a substantial
reservoir of authority and precedent which could serve an applicant
well, even at the present time.
One further point need be made. The AEC's existing practice of
handling reactor licensing cases on an individual basis without particular regard for consistency or precedent may be conducive to maximum development of reactor technology at the present time. Such an
approach is not, however, consistent with the long-term development
of a sound body of administrative law which would furnish a basis
for sound economic judgments on the part of the nuclear industry.
It is likely that such rules of the game will not commence to be developed until pressure from industry in reactor licensing proceedings
before the AEC forces the AEC to follow, distinguish, or explicitly
reject precedent in its safety determinations. 12 1
121. A possible alternative, of course, is to amend the act so as to establish
some more definite criteria and standards for reactor safety, and so as to

make more explicit the meaning of some of the licensing procedures. In
particular, the nature and significance of the construction permit might well
be clarified.

